Lost in the brouhaha of Pakistan-FATA-Afghanistan and talk of Pakistani
surrender to flat-earth clerics is the single most important statistic about
one of the world's eight nuclear powers: 63 percent of Pakistan's 173
million people do not know how to read or write, or well over 100 million
dirt-poor, illiterate people. And only 26 percent of women are literate.
Next door in Afghanistan the stats are even grimmer: Only 18.7 percent of
males and 2.8 percent of women qualify as literate.
In Pakistan, for the government to concede victory to Islamist
extremists, along with a license to impose Shariah law in the Swat Valley,
Pakistan's favorite tourist destination, was the line of least resistance.
With little hope for material improvement over a lifetime, the average
Pakistani is quickly seduced by what he or she hears in the mosques on
Fridays and on some 50 TV channels about the wicked imperialists — the
United States, India, and Israel — and their plans to either harm or destroy
Islam.
An alarming number of Pakistanis believe that Sept. 11, 2001, was a plot
engineered by a CIA-Mossad-RAW (Research and Analysis Wing, India's main
intelligence agency) conspiracy designed to provide the imperialists with a
gigantic provocation that then justified war against Afghanistan's religious
dictatorship.
Now almost daily, Pakistanis hear news about a U.S. unmanned Predator
attack in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that killed
innocent civilians. There is a seemingly endless parade on local TV news of
dead Pakistanis, victims of a Predator missile fired by remote control from
the control cockpit on the ground in Nevada.
Pakistani TV is to news what bumper stickers are to jihad. If there were
Oscars for self-delusion, Pakistanis would sweep the field. Some 1,500
people a year in recent years have been killed by suicide bombers and other
acts of terrorism. Every major city has been victim of suicide violence.
Recruiting teenage boys for trips to another world is the easy part.
The pro-American stance of the civilian government, led by Asif Ali
Zardari, the widower of the late Benazir Bhutto, is understandably unpopular
among the masses.
Virulent anti-Americanism took root with the U.S. failure to come to
Pakistan's aid during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971. This was when Pakistan
lost half its country. And this was also the loss that convinced the
Pakistanis they should give top priority to the development of a nuclear
weapon, which, in turn, provoked the United States into imposing tough
diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions.
The 20 percent of Pakistanis who are the Western-oriented, educated class
are not hostile to America, simply uneasy with a relationship that has led
to U.S. bombings in FATA and an Afghan war that is spreading without any end
in sight.
They also can see that their own fragile democracy appears to be heading
back to a military takeover. The army is anxious to stay out of politics,
but Zardari's inexplicably harmful actions may leave the army no choice.
Zardari suddenly imposed federal rule — i.e., his own — on Punjab
province and dismissed its provincial government, which followed a Supreme
Court ruling that disqualified from public office his principal opponent,
former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, now the country's most popular political
leader, as well as Sharif's brother Shahbaz, the province's chief minister.
Punjab is Pakistan's political heartland and the largest of its four
provinces. Lahore, the provincial capital, is also Pakistan's cultural
center. And this latest opportunity for settling scores in the streets
erupted as top Pakistani and Afghan officials met in Washington with their
U.S. counterparts to put the relationship on a sounder basis — with $7.5
billion over five years for nonmilitary aid and $1 billion to hunt down
Taliban and al-Qaida fighters in FATA.
Pakistan asked the United States to turn over control of the unmanned
drones that are bombing Taliban and al-Qaida targets in FATA. With Pakistan
Muslim League partisans of the two Sharif brothers battling Zardari's
Pakistan People's Party supporters in the streets of Lahore, all bets were
off again as the country's two leading political figures side-slipped back
to the 1990s. This was when their political parties kept toppling each other
until army chief Pervez Musharraf staged a coup in 1999 — and dispatched
Nawaz Sharif into exile in Saudi Arabia.
Once again, Nawaz Sharif and Zardari were fighting, not for good
governance, but for political survival. Obama administration calls for more
decisive action against Islamist extremists suddenly appeared to be the
least of their concerns.
Several Washington think tanks rushed into production with agendas to be
unveiled, as army chiefs and foreign ministers from Pakistan and Afghanistan
huddled in Washington for a series of trilateral and bilateral meetings with
U.S. counterparts.
Engineered by Ambassador at Large Richard Holbrooke and CENTCOM commander
Gen. David H. Petraeus, the meetings were designed to hammer out a common
strategy to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and take down its safe havens,
along with al-Qaida's, in FATA.
As Zardari himself put it recently, "We (the United States, Pakistan,
Afghanistan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) are losing the
battle." There was little trust among the four and little agreement on what
the final objective should be in Afghanistan. It was now Obama's war and
could become Obama's Vietnam.
Law enforcement sources in the capital of Pakistan's North-West Frontier
province told us the Swat Valley surrender to Islamist extremists could
embolden them to seize government offices and police stations in Peshawar
and then battle it out against the army, which would quickly tire of killing
civilians. After the Swat accord on the imposition of Shariah law, the army
that had been fighting religious zealots for a year went back to its
barracks.
Much also depends on the Taliban's military plans for the spring and
summer. A "Tet-type" offensive against two or three large Afghan towns
simultaneously, even if successfully repulsed, would kill what little public
support still exists in NATO Europe for staying the course of 5,500
kilometers "out of area."
A NATO withdrawal, leaving the United States alone to fend off the
Taliban, would 1) kill NATO and 2) give al-Qaida manna from Allah. What it
will do to Barack Obama's congressional majority in the 2010 election cycle
is still anyone's guess.
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